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Humans tend to discount the value of delayed rewards. Peters and Bu¨chel show in this issue of Neuron that
the ability to appraise the value of such future rewards improves when future-oriented cognitive processes in
the brain are recruited using personally relevant information. These results provide the platform for exciting
new questions.Our brains are equipped with the ability
to mentally project us to the future so
that we can explore potential actions
and outcomes in advance. As Karl Popper
famously said, we should ‘‘.let our false
theories die in our stead’’ (Popper,
1963). Future-oriented thinking is indeed
a basic operation of our proactive brain
(Bar et al., 2007), and mental simulation
serves the basis for many cognitive
processes (e.g., Bar, 2009; Barsalou,
2009; Hassabis and Maguire, 2009;
Buckner and Carroll, 2007; Moulton and
Kosslyn, 2009; Schacter and Addis,
2009). One domain where future-oriented
simulations could be particularly benefi-
cial is in assessing the value of future
rewards.
In a famous experiment from the late
1960s, Walter Mischel and colleagues
asked four-year-old children to choose
between one marshmallow immediately
or, if they could wait, two marshmallows
twenty minutes later (see an illuminating
popular coverage in Lehrer, 2009). The
vast majority of the children opted for
the immediate gratification of a single
marshmallow. These experiments are
traditionally taken as studies of self-
control and impulsivity, and the dominant
neural explanation to this impulsive deci-
sion making in children focuses on their
yet immature prefrontal cortex. How
exactly does the prefrontal cortex regu-
late impulsive behavior? The ingenious
paper by Peters and Bu¨chel (2010) in
this issue ofNeuron provides a convincing
account. They studied the mechanisms
required for an accurate evaluation of
future rewards using the phenomenon4 Neuron 66, April 15, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inof delay discounting: the tendency to
discount the value of a potential reward
as a function of temporal distance to its
delivery in the future. Their study resulted
in two main findings, both of which are
highly important. First, the neural mecha-
nisms mediating future-oriented mental
processes need to be engaged during
decision making for decisions to be
more accurate. Second, using personally
relevant (i.e., episodic) information when
imagining the specific reward at the
specific point in the future recruits this
necessary network more effectively and
results in reduced delay discounting.
Therefore, appreciating the value of future
rewards and the benefit of acting to obtain
them relies on our ability to imagine the
relevant future. When the prefrontal
cortex is sufficiently developed and prop-
erly employed and interacts with other
regions, we can exert a more experi-
ence-based, consequence-oriented influ-
ence on our decision-making process.
On each trial, participants in this fMRI
experiment were given a choice of reward
magnitude (e.g., 20, 26, or 35 V) and a
reward delivery time (e.g., immediately,
in 30 days, or in 45 days). In half of these
trials, the reward option was presented
along with an ‘‘episodic cue’’ derived
from a previous individual interview. The
prescan interview is a critical and original
aspect of the design, which yielded infor-
mation about participants’ own future
events planned for the time that coincided
with the future reward delivery. In addi-
tion, after each scan the participants
were asked to report the frequency and
vividness of the associations evoked byc.each episodic cue during the experiment.
The behavioral results showed that
when decision-making network recruits
future-thinking network, the result is
reduced discounting of value. Further-
more, the effect of episodic cues on
reducing reward discounting was
stronger for future episodes that were
imagined more vividly.
As to the neural findings, the critical
aspect was that the recruitment of areas
previously implicated in future-oriented
mental processes was correlated with
improved decision making related to
future rewards. A great deal is already
known about the regions involved in
typical decision making, valuation, and
cognitive control, which include the ante-
rior cingulate cortex (ACC), the medial
and lateral prefrontal cortex (PFC), and
the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) (Bal-
lard and Knutson, 2009; Kable and
Glimcher, 2007; McClure et al., 2004).
Similarly, a great deal is known about
the network involved in future-oriented
processes, which includes the ventrome-
dial PFC (vmPFC), hippocampal forma-
tion, and the medial parietal cortex
(MPC) (Bar, 2009; Buckner and Carroll,
2007; Hassabis and Maguire, 2009;
Schacter and Addis, 2009). It is the char-
acterization of these networks’ relative
recruitment and their interaction in the
service of better evaluation of a delayed
reward that is novel and important. The
functional coupling of prefrontal
and hippocampal activations provides
the neural basis for the authors’ conclu-
sion that delay discounting is inversely
related to the extent of interaction with
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tional coupling of the prefrontal cortex
with the amygdala, on the other hand,
reminds us that decisions are naturally
also dependent on the emotional and
arousal levels that a potential reward
elicits.
Interestingly, the regions suggested by
predominant accounts (Ballard and Knut-
son, 2009; Kable and Glimcher, 2007;
McClure et al., 2004) to represent and
process reward value—the medial pre-
frontal cortex (mPFC), hippocampal
formation, and the PCC—overlap with
the network involved in future-oriented
processing. This striking overlap raises
the question of which of the activations
attributed by these previous studies to
decision making are exclusive to decision
making proper, and which are a manifes-
tation of the future-related component
recruited for making those decisions.
The paper by Peters and Bu¨chel (2010)
underscores the need to refine this dis-
tinction. This interdependence is reminis-
cent of another overlap: between memory
systems and the network involved in
foresight, primarily in the hippocampus
(Bar, 2009; Hassabis and Maguire, 2009;
Schacter and Addis, 2009). Is the hippo-
campus directly involved in future-ori-
ented processes, or is it instead active in
such processes because foresight relies
on memory? The conclusion may be that
none of these networks—decision
making, predictions, and memory—is
truly independent and their function can-
not be distinguished from each other’s:
memory provides the basis for predic-
tions, and predictions provide the basis
for decision making.
It is important to note that delay dis-
counting is only one of many types of
distortions of future-related decision
making, which are diverse and have
fundamental impact on our lives. For
example, people show consistent inac-
curacies in their ability to estimate how
much happiness a certain event would
bring (Gilbert, 2006). Can enhanced
imagery improve judgments about pre-
dicted happiness as well? Supportive of
this possibility is a demonstration from
studies of affective forecasting, where
encouraging participants to use more
elaborated thinking (i.e., to think about
additional activities expected to occur at
the specific time in the future) improvesthe quality of their predictions (Wilson
et al., 2000). In another example, the
planning fallacy (Buehler et al., 1994),
subjects have been shown to underesti-
mate how long a certain task will take
them to complete in the future (which
might be why we find ourselves so often
too close to deadlines). One of the expla-
nations provided for this estimation
distortion is that subjects focused too
much on the future task itself and not
enough on past experience with similar
tasks. This is in perfect agreement with
the idea that to predict accurately one
needs to activate relevant memories.
The findings of Peters and Bu¨chel
(2010) provide the cognitive neuroscience
platform for a host of exciting new ques-
tions and implications, and I will raise a
few of them here. First, that enhanced
imagery improved evaluation of future
rewards has an immediate clinical poten-
tial: can various patient (and healthy) pop-
ulations with impulsive behavior benefit
from deliberately activating rich, vivid,
episodic associations before making
decisions regarding future rewards?
Second, is it the personal relevance of
the episodic cue that reduces discount-
ing, or is it merely the fact that episodic
information elicits richer associations
and imagery, and it is this increased detail
that improves valuation? If it is the latter,
one would expect that even personally
irrelevant imagery, if it is possible, will
elicit the same benefit in future-related
decision making. Third, future-oriented
thinking relies on memory and experi-
ence, and the natural lack of experience
in young children significantly reduces
their ability to imagine future events and
consequences. Is it the case that in-
creased experience boosts the ability to
imagine the future thereby driving the
development of the prefrontal cortex?
Or, instead, that a more developed
prefrontal cortex results in an improved
ability for future-oriented thinking and
the corresponding guidance of behavior?
The answer might be that foresight and
the structural development of the PFC
bootstrap each other, but how they
interact to achieve this over the years is
important to understand. This question is
similarly interesting in the context of
aging, where experience is ample but
the integrity of the prefrontal cortex and
the hippocampus is gradually compro-Neurmised. If aging leads to increased delay
discounting, is it because of a diminished
cognitive ability to engage future-related
processes, or because of a vanishing
memory that could otherwise provide the
basis for such mental projections? Fourth,
the ability to properly evaluate a delayed
reward may not necessarily guarantee
willingness to wait for this reward. Evalu-
ating and deferring gratification might
originate from the operation of two dif-
ferent, although tightly interacting, mech-
anisms. It is important to learn more about
how these two interact. Fifth, what are the
computational operations performed by
the brain to transform a present value, or
a past value in memory, into a future
value? This question is relevant more
globally to any type of future-oriented
thought; how is a memory converted to
anticipation?
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